QA hardening: security RLS fixes, Flutter 3.47.5 upgrade, UI/validation fixes

Security — enforce write authorization server-side (was UI/RPC-only):
- it_service_requests RLS: block cross-office read/edit + self-approve (QA-015)
- pass_slips RLS: owner can complete but not self-approve (QA-046)
- swap_requests RLS: scope select/update to participants + admin (QA-047)
- storage: tighten it_service_attachments + task_attachments write/delete (QA-027)
- admin_user_management edge function: allow programmers to manage users (QA-016)

Fixes:
- workforce generator "uncovered shifts" false alarms (QA-043/044)
- network-map VLAN + New-location dialog validation, disabled-until-valid (QA-048)
- de-flake time-of-day-dependent dashboard metrics test (QA-045)

Toolchain:
- upgrade to Flutter 3.47.5 / Dart 3.13.4; font_awesome_flutter 11.0.0,
  flutter_quill 11.6.0, pdfrx 2.6.5; clear resulting deprecations (QA-002)

analyze clean; 139 tests pass; web build succeeds. Report + evidence in docs/qa/.

Note: also carries the in-progress Brick model cleanup already present in the
working tree. QA-001 (AI keys public in the build) is deferred by owner decision.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

supabase/migrations/20260926100000_swap_requests_rls_hardening.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+-- QA-047: swap_requests authorization bypass.
+--
+-- Live REST probes with a non-privileged it_staff token showed:
+--   * SELECT is not scoped: any authenticated user reads EVERY swap (60/60),
+--     including 48 they are neither requester nor recipient of.
+--   * UPDATE is not scoped: the requester could PATCH their OWN swap straight
+--     to status='accepted' (forging the recipient's acceptance), and a total
+--     non-participant could PATCH ANY swap's status/recipient. This bypasses the
+--     identity checks in respond_shift_swap() entirely (same class as QA-015).
+--
+-- The base swap_requests policies live in a migration that predates this repo
+-- ("already exists in many deployments"), so their names aren't known here;
+-- the DO block drops whatever SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policies exist and
+-- this migration then defines the complete, hardened set. Safe because:
+--   * respond_shift_swap() (accept/reject/escalate) is SECURITY DEFINER
+--     (20260322170000+), so it mutates rows regardless of these policies.
+--   * request_shift_swap() inserts with requester_id = auth.uid().
+--   * The only direct table UPDATE the app makes is reassignSwap(), an
+--     admin/dispatcher action (workforce_provider.dart:reassignSwap).
+
+ALTER TABLE public.swap_requests ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+
+DO $$
+DECLARE
+  pol record;
+BEGIN
+  FOR pol IN
+    SELECT policyname FROM pg_policies
+    WHERE schemaname = 'public' AND tablename = 'swap_requests'
+  LOOP
+    EXECUTE format('DROP POLICY IF EXISTS %I ON public.swap_requests', pol.policyname);
+  END LOOP;
+END $$;
+
+-- SELECT: only the two participants and admins/dispatchers. The provider still
+-- filters client-side, so tightening here only removes rows a user shouldn't
+-- have seen in the first place.
+CREATE POLICY "swap_requests: select" ON public.swap_requests
+  FOR SELECT TO authenticated USING (
+    requester_id = auth.uid()
+    OR recipient_id = auth.uid()
+    OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM public.profiles p
+               WHERE p.id = auth.uid() AND p.role IN ('admin', 'dispatcher'))
+  );
+
+-- INSERT: a user may only open a swap as themselves (request_shift_swap pins
+-- requester_id to auth.uid()).
+CREATE POLICY "swap_requests: insert" ON public.swap_requests
+  FOR INSERT TO authenticated WITH CHECK (
+    requester_id = auth.uid()
+  );
+
+-- UPDATE: only admins/dispatchers may write the row directly (reassignSwap).
+-- Participants accept/reject/escalate through respond_shift_swap(), which is
+-- SECURITY DEFINER and therefore not bound by this policy. This is what closes
+-- the bypass: a requester/recipient can no longer forge status directly.
+CREATE POLICY "swap_requests: update" ON public.swap_requests
+  FOR UPDATE TO authenticated USING (
+    EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM public.profiles p
+            WHERE p.id = auth.uid() AND p.role IN ('admin', 'dispatcher'))
+  )
+  WITH CHECK (
+    EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM public.profiles p
+            WHERE p.id = auth.uid() AND p.role IN ('admin', 'dispatcher'))
+  );
+
+-- No DELETE policy: direct deletes stay blocked (unchanged behaviour).